Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are fighting a bitter war for control in the Sahel. This conflict, which started in early September, involves hundreds of fighters in the Liptako-Gourma borderlands. Wassim Nasr said, "It will shape what comes next." Their struggle for dominance could change the future of the region.

A bitter conflict between the two rival jihadi groups could reshape the balance of power in the Sahel

They are the select snapshots of a secretive war whose outcome will affect the fates of millions: jihadis sweeping into battle on motorbikes; burned and bloodied corpses scattered in the dust; and stolen machine guns snatched as spoils.

These images, circulated by Islamic State and its propagandists, offer glimpses into its bitter bloodletting with al-Qaeda over the past three months on the battlefields of the Sahel.

The mortal enemies have already spent years conquering growing swaths of territory and pinning the three embattled military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger into ever-tighter corners. Now the fight for dominance between them could further shape the future of the war-weary region.

While al-Qaeda and Islamic State have been skirmishing for years, their latest fighting -- whose epicentre is the remote Liptako-Gourma borderlands where the three countries meet -- may have been more violent and involved more fighters than ever before.

"It will shape what comes next," said Wassim Nasr, an expert on the movements at the New York-based Soufan Center, who added that the little information that had so far seeped out was mainly propaganda from Islamic State. "It will have a huge impact if there is a major victory for one side over the other."

Their fight makes the Sahel one of the few places where al-Qaeda and Islamic State are meeting at such scale on the battlefield.

Al-Qaeda has been active in the region for about two decades, fighting over the years both French troops allied to former Sahel governments and the Russian-backed military regimes that replaced them and called in Russian paramilitaries for support.

While the group consolidated disparate factions into a movement known as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in 2017, Islamic State began operating independently more than a decade ago after a split with another militant Islamist faction.

JNIM is the more potent militant force, estimated to have thousands of men across more than seven countries. Its successes have made it enemy number one for its smaller and more hardline challenger in Islamic State.

The latest fighting between them began in early September and has resulted in at least two intense battles involving hundreds -- if not more -- men on each side, analysts say.

Héni Nsaibia, an expert on the region with conflict monitoring organisation ACLED, said Islamic State had historically tended to use hit-and-run tactics against JNIM, melting away once the larger group reinforced. "It is an insurgency within an insurgency," he said.

While Islamic State has aggressively trumpeted its alleged battlefield successes, JNIM's propaganda channels have so far been quieter.

Analysts say it is unclear who has gained the upper hand in the recent fighting, but it is JNIM that has the most at stake. The group has been edging closer towards achieving its core objective of overthrowing the regime in Mali, where it seeks to impose strict Islamic rule, since it launched an offensive in late April.

The conflict with Islamic State, whose ambition is to create a caliphate in the Sahel, is forcing it into a distracting fight on two fronts, requiring JNIM to redeploy men to meet the challenge on its rear.

But analysts say the jihadi warfare has spurred a race for recruits and resources that is making both of them stronger overall, relative to the stretched militaries that they also fighting.

It also further radicalises their ranks by hardening the ideological divergences between them, which will make any effort to demobilise and defang them harder.

"This fight has contributed to their growth, rather than their weakening," said Nsaibia. "It pushes them towards further mobilisation, towards more recruitment, further expansion and then to even more competition."

This is making countries, even beyond the Sahel, worried. Islamic State has raced into north-western Nigeria and Benin in an effort to widen its reach and has linked up with its ferocious sister branch around Lake Chad, spreading the Islamist battlefield southwards. In northern Benin, JNIM has staged a series of assaults on military barracks and outposts since late February.

Neither group shows signs of exhaustion at the moment. They have substantial war chests filled by large ransom payments. JNIM, said by the UN to be bankrolling other branches of al-Qaeda, last year reportedly received about $50mn for a single hostage. Islamic State also received substantial payments for western hostages in recent months.

But their rivalry is as much ideological as it about resources.

JNIM has been more pragmatic as it seeks to turn its military prowess into political power. It has partnered with non-Islamist militias in Mali, negotiated with local leaders and adopted village grievances as its own. It has increasingly begun producing propaganda in local languages and even in French, a lingua franca long shunned by Islamists.

This is all anathema to Islamic State, which views them as wayward apostates. Its soldiers, whose commanders have been less interested in securing buy-in from local communities, spare no quarter with civilians. Analysts added that Islamic State rejected negotiations and was pursuing its caliphate through extreme violence alone.

"JNIM has an immediate political project, which is destabilising Mali and overthrowing the juntas in the Sahel," said Bakary Sambe at the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute, a research centre. "It is obliged to fight the Islamic State when it gets in the way."

Both see their fight in the Sahel as one in which the victor will need to destroy, or at least overrun, the other in order to establish a monopoly over jihadism in the region. "They want to cannibalise each other," said Nasr.

"If Islamic State wins, it will be a new ball game for the countries of the region, and if JNIM consolidates more, it will become even more challenging both militarily and politically," said Nasr, adding that the countries of the Sahel and their southern neighbours needed to prepare for both.