Europe Express: opening a security can of worms

Initiating a discussion about changing Nato before a ceasefire in Ukraine gives Moscow additional leverage

Welcome back. When a problem is too difficult to solve, make it bigger. The strategy seemed to work for Dwight Eisenhower, to whom the phrase is often attributed. It is unlikely to succeed with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, the US peace envoys seeking to breathe new life into moribund peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

Faced with Russian intransigence on ending its war of conquest in Ukraine, the two envoys this week enlarged the problem by adding in the question of Europe's security architecture, much to the delight of the Kremlin.

You can reach me at ben.hall@ft.com

Root causes

It has been a longstanding demand of Russian President Vladimir Putin to address what he maintains are the "root causes" of the war. Chief among them is the overlapping web of organisations, treaties and norms that underpin security in Europe, which Moscow claims are a threat against its sovereignty.

Some analysts such as the Rand Corporation's Samuel Charap say differences between Russia and Nato have to be managed if any peace in Europe is to be durable.

But European leaders have insisted that any substantive discussion about security arrangements must come after a ceasefire in Ukraine and that accepting this demand at the outset of peace talks means falling into a Russian trap.

The American envoys say no deal on Ukraine can be reached without Europe and Europeans will be involved in the next round of talks, but Russia remains hostile to a European role.

"They've [Kushner and Witkoff] played into Putin's hands, and it's only going to embolden him," says John Lough, head of foreign policy at the Nest Centre, a London-based think-tank on Russia.

Russia's insistence on rewriting the post-cold war order is a diversion from its own illegal invasion of Ukraine, which was a blatant violation of fundamental security principles Moscow had previously signed up to, such as the inviolability of national borders, solving disputes through diplomacy rather than force and ensuring a country's sovereign right to choose its own alliances.

New Yalta

Russia wants to use the Ukraine war to re-establish its dominance over eastern Europe, prevent any further enlargement of Nato, and partially roll back the 1999 expansion of the alliance to former Soviet bloc countries by excluding Nato troop deployments to those countries (see this paper by security expert William Alberque on the demands Russia made on the eve of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine).

Vladimir Medinsky, the chief Russia negotiator at this week's talks in Abu Dhabi, called for "a new Yalta and Potsdam", a reference to the conferences where allied leaders carved up postwar Europe into spheres of influence.

Initiating a discussion about changing the continent's security architecture before a ceasefire in Ukraine has been established gives Moscow additional leverage to oppose European long-term financial and military support for Ukraine's armed forces and a possible European military presence in Ukraine. As far as Kyiv is concerned, these are conditions for any negotiated settlement with Russia.

Opening up the "security architecture" can of worms could also drive a wedge between Europe and America at a time when the US is preparing to scale back its contribution to European defence and President Donald Trump's own commitment to Nato's collective security is in doubt. Creating that transatlantic rift has been a longstanding Russian objective.

Pay attention

European leaders appeared to have been more preoccupied with the vexed question of who should represent them in any Ukrainian peace negotiations rather than the direction and substance of those talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is usually the one trying to fend off solutions imposed by other countries, warned that "Europe really needs to pay attention".

Is there any room for compromise on security arrangements?

Kushner last week said on X that the US was exploring five goals: "permanent security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risks, and an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability."

He also said "Nato will remain central to European collective defence, and this initiative would build upon existing institutions and commitments". That suggests any mooted changes might be modest.

US officials have floated the idea of reviving the Nato-Russia Council, a consultative body created in 2002 to give Russia a voice in the alliance's deliberations, but which Moscow in effect repudiated as it geared up for war against Ukraine.

But Moscow seems to have more far-reaching proposals. The Russian foreign ministry suggested this week that one way to revise arrangements in its favour would be for individual Nato members to sign mutual non-aggression pacts with Russia, a move that would eviscerate the mutual defence guarantee at the heart of the alliance.

Europeans have agency. It is hard to imagine a dismantling of their existing security framework being imposed on them by Moscow. But whether Russia can further weaken Trump's commitment to Nato is another matter.

Ben's pick of the week:

Mercedes Ruehl and Tom Wilson on how Switzerland's rescue of a Russian bank went spectacularly wrong