The Communist Party published new rules on Monday to centralise control over local committees. These regulations replace the 2015 version, shifting focus toward Xi Jinping Thought. Local leaders must now start meetings by studying his instructions. These committees remain the real seat of power, managing all major government decisions.

The Communist Party has published rules that centralise control over every provincial, city and county committee with four shifts from the 2015 version: a sharper focus on Xi Jinping Thought, a wider remit for local committees, tighter control over personnel and a new emphasis on discipline

All eyes this week are on Shenzhen, where leaders of the APEC grouping will meet for their annual summit. The summit, however, is being overshadowed by the first-ever sit-down between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. As significant as this is, it is arguably not the most important political development in China this week. On Monday, the Communist Party published a revised set of regulations detailing how the country will be governed in the years ahead.

The Regulations on the Work of Local Committees of the Communist Party of China govern every local Party committee and its standing committee at the provincial, city and county levels. These committees, and not the governments they oversee, are the real seat of power in China. They set the direction, decide major issues, manage cadres and supervise the legislatures, governments, courts and procuratorates in their jurisdictions. The rules that bind them are, in effect, the operating manual for governing China below Beijing.

The last version of this regulation was issued in 2015, three years into Xi's tenure. Set side by side with the new text, it reveals four significant shifts.

The first change is ideological. The 2015 regulations asked local committees to arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Xi featured only as the author of a "series of important speeches" whose spirit cadres were asked to implement. In the 2026 text, the references to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought have been removed. This is remarkable. Instead, Article 3 reads like a summary of Xi's political programme. It calls on everyone to use Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guide, emphasises the centrality of his leadership and position, and stresses on his vision of China's modernisation. Article 4 makes upholding the authority of "the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core" the precondition for all else. Article 9 translates this into routine practice through the "first item on the agenda" system, under which committee meetings must open by studying Xi's latest instructions, and demands that committees "resolutely follow the command of the Party Central Committee."

All eyes this week are on Shenzhen, where leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping are meeting for their annual summit. The summit, however, is being overshadowed by the first-ever sit-down between U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. As significant as that is, it is arguably not the most important political development in China this week. On Monday, the Communist Party published a revised set of regulations detailing how the country will be governed in the years ahead.

The Regulations on the Work of Local Committees of the Communist Party of China govern every local Party committee and its standing committee at the provincial, city and county levels. These committees, rather than the governments they oversee, are the real seat of power in China. They set the direction, decide major issues, manage cadres and supervise the legislatures, governments, courts and procuratorates in their jurisdictions. The rules that bind them are, in effect, the operating manual for governing China below Beijing.

The previous version of this regulations was issued in 2015, three years into Mr. Xi's tenure. Read side by side, the two texts reveal four significant shifts.

The first change is ideological. The 2015 regulations asked local committees to arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Mr. Xi featured only as the author of a "series of important speeches" whose spirit cadres were asked to implement. In the 2026 text, the references to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought have been removed. Article 3 instead reads like a summary of Xi's political programme. It calls on everyone to use Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guide, emphasises the centrality of his leadership and position, and stresses his vision of China's modernisation. Article 4 makes upholding the authority of "the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core" the precondition for all else. Article 9 translates this into routine practice through the "first item on the agenda" system, under which committee meetings must open by studying Mr. Xi's relevant instructions, and demands that committees "resolutely follow the command of the Party Central Committee."

Blurred lines

The second shift concerns the remit of local Party committees. The 2015 text empowered them to exercise "overall leadership", but their remit was limited to "political, ideological and organisational" domains. That qualifier has now been deleted. The revised Article 5 directs committees to strengthen overall leadership over economic, political, cultural, social and ecological work, and to make decisions on major issues in their regions. In essence, the fine line between the local Party committee and local government has been further eroded.

Third, on the issue of personnel and the qualities required of them, Article 7 now opens by requiring that political standards come first in staffing local committees, with political integrity as a qualification placed ahead of capability and competence. Political integrity, in this context, implies alignment with the central agenda. In addition, each committee's membership must be filled with the committee one level up, the grounds for automatically ending a member's tenure have been widened, and the higher committee's power to appoint and remove members of lower committees is spelled out more clearly. In short, higher-level committees now enjoy far greater powers of oversight and control over individuals at lower levels.

Fourth, the 2015 regulations were largely about streamlining procedures and, to an extent, empowering local committees to lead. The 2026 document, on the other hand, is focused on building guardrails around what committees and individuals in leadership positions can and cannot do. The emphasis is on discipline and intensifying control by higher-level committees. For example, an entirely new Article 27 lists 10 kinds of prohibited conduct. These range from ensuring that officials implement central decisions to the letter to barring vanity projects, new local government debtand local-level protectionism that hinders the goal of building a unified national market.

Article 18 further reins in the local "top leaders", essentially preventing them from cultivating their own fiefdoms. New procedures also require recusal, oblige the secretary to speak last in meetings and postpone votes when there is serious disagreement. Article 30 introduces lifelong accountability for secretaries and standing committee members for major decision-making errors.

What does all this add up to? Beijing has long wrestled with a dilemma. Local officials control the engines of growth and policy experimentation, but they are also behind debt binges, statistical fudging, protectionism and corruption.

The 2026 regulations resolve this tension decisively in favour of central control. Local committees gain broader authority over everything in their jurisdictions, but they must exercise it within tighter ideological bounds, under closer supervision from above, and with personal liability that never goes away. This structurally tightens Mr. Xi's control over the Party. It is, however, unlikely to produce greater initiative and policy innovation.