Chandra Shekhar Aazad’s Azad Samaj Party and Asaduddin Owaisi’s AIMIM will contest the Uttar Pradesh election together. This alliance shows how smaller parties struggle to survive against the BJP’s dominance. By joining forces, these leaders hope to protect their social base and sustain the pressures of tough electoral competition today.
The announcement by Chandra Shekhar Aazad's Azad Samaj Party (ASP) and Asaduddin Owaisi's All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) that they will contest the Uttar Pradesh election jointly raises predictable concerns -- of hurting the chances of the Samajwadi Party, which sees itself as the main challenger to the BJP in UP, and presenting ASP and AIMIM as the B Team of the BJP.
But name-calling apart, the move by Aazad and Owaisi needs to be seen as characterising the dilemmas and challenges faced by most parties, particularly "smaller"ones, within the framework of a dominant-party system. The BJP's dominance is partly comparable to that once enjoyed by Congress in most parts of the country, but differs in one crucial respect: It is openly based on the consolidation of Hindu votes. This consolidation seeks to include Dalit and Adivasi votes wherever possible, but primarily, it brings the upper castes together with major sections of the OBCs. This has hurt both Congress and the legatees of Mandal.
The Hindu vote bank the BJP has shaped clearly doesn't bother with the votes of minorities -- Muslims in particular. Even in states where Muslims have a larger presence, such as Assam, West Bengal or Bihar, the BJP's Hindu vote has managed to outmanoeuvre them. In this context, the obvious strategy available to the Opposition is twofold. One, to cut into the Hindu vote as much as possible along with consolidating Muslim votes against the BJP. Two, and because no single non-BJP party is in a position to bring these social segments together, it becomes necessary for the non-BJP parties to enter into alliances among themselves so that the former strategy works out in elections.
But this also poses a dilemma before smaller parties with a sectional base or limited regional base within a state. If they join the relatively larger parties, the chances of being swallowed by the latter will mean they cannot exist or expand. If, on the other hand, they operate independently, their limited space and resources will mean they can never expand -- they will anyway be swallowed either by the dominant party or by the Opposition. What Aazad and Owaisi are doing in UP represents a response to this dilemma. By coming together, smaller players with a narrowly defined but reliable social base hope to sustain the pressures
of electoral competition. They have followings that are more amenable to transferring votes to each other's candidates, but their narrow base is also unlikely to be easily "stolen" by the alliance partner. Once they have proven their presence as a major political factor, they will be in a position to negotiate with whoever is in need of support after the elections.
While this shows that there is a sensible rationale behind the alliance-making of smaller parties, it is doubtful if this strategy really saves them from the larger risks of being swallowed or marginalised. So far, Owaisi has failed to seriously dent competitive politics in favour of his party almost anywhere in the country. Except for the occasional waves AIMIM creates and the headache his party gives to other opposition parties, Owaisi has yet to show whether his strategy helps his party expand and play a critical role as a major protector of secular politics. Aazad's challenge is no less serious, with BSP traditionally being a party of the Dalits in UP, if not elsewhere.
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But more than these limited issues of electoral success, for both Aazad and Owaisi, and for such smaller and sectional players, competitive politics poses a more complicated dilemma. Following the announcement of the latest alliance, supporters of the parties are eagerly pointing out that together Dalits and Muslims account for 40 per cent of UP's electorate. Leaving aside the practical question as to whether these communities will en bloc vote for these parties, the calculation leaves out a more serious question. On the one hand, a party that avowedly looks forward to support from one particular social segment of voters can hardly be the choice of other social segments, thus limiting the pool of voters available to it. On the other hand, a party that seeks to challenge the BJP (ostensibly for the latter's Hindu consolidation), must find it awkward to carve a similarly community-based vote as its base. This is not merely a question of pragmatism; it is also a question of principle. It is not just that the BJP's Hindu consolidation cannot be defeated by consolidation of the "non-Hindu" vote; it is also an ideological challenge.
Despite a long history of separate Dalit assertion and an independent Muslim politics, democratic politics in India has not resolved the complication involved in this approach. Nor have the so-called larger parties found a robust response to the twin challenges of mobilising citizens as members of a political community and also adequately accommodating or transcending community interests. Congress came close to doing that in many states once upon a time, but was quickly hijacked by dominant social sections in each state. That resulted in its demise as it once was. Today, we might forget the BSP but it may be well to remember that after first mobilising the Dalits and then attracting sections of the OBCs, the BSP launched its sarvajan samaj drive to momentarily experience ascendance. In that fleeting moment was the key to these dilemmas: A politics of all communities predicated on the inversion of social relations and the promotion of the "lower" to higher political roles.
While both the ASP and the AIMIM may do well to learn from that, the lessons should also be urgently learnt by the supposed "mainstream" parties, who are self-appointed challengers to the BJP.
