US's Freedom of Navigation ops against India: What it means for bilateral ties

Three operations in FY2025 challenging Indian maritime claims is the highest number recorded against India in a single year since 1991. This, however, didn't get public attention or a publicised diplomatic response from New Delhi.

The United States conducted three Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenging Indian maritime claims in fiscal year 2025, the highest number recorded against India in a single year since publicly available records began in 1991. The finding is significant not only for the claims they challenge but also because they come amid expanding India-US naval cooperation and growing friction in the broader bilateral relationship.

The US maintains that its Freedom of Navigation (FON) programme is a legal tool, not a political instrument directed at particular countries. A comparison of historical data for India and China, however, raises an important question: while maritime law provides the stated justification for these operations, does the frequency with which they are conducted also reflect the changing state of bilateral relations?

History of the US Freedom of Navigation programme

The US FON Programme began in March 1979. Its purpose is to protect US freedom of navigation, overflight (flight or passage of aircraft over a specific area, territory, or country without landing), and other lawful uses of the seas against what Washington considers excessive maritime claims by coastal states.

The programme combines diplomatic protests with operational assertions by US military forces. An assertion is a formal declaration, physical action, or legal claim made by a nation to state its rights, jurisdiction, or sovereignty over a specific area of the sea.

The programme emerged during negotiations over the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982. Although the US has not ratified UNCLOS, it recognises many of its provisions concerning traditional uses of the oceans as reflecting customary international law.

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In undertaking FONOPs, the US takes the status of a "persistent objector". Its operations are intended to demonstrate non-acceptance of unilateral restrictions on freedom of navigation (in the US's interpretation) beyond the jurisdiction permitted under international law by the coastal states and prevent them from becoming established through state practice.

The US insists that the programme is applied impartially, including against allies and partners, and is not intended to signal hostility towards any particular country. The historical record, however, provides an opportunity to examine that claim.

What maritime claims of India does the US contest?

The principal disagreements concern India's interpretation of coastal-state jurisdiction, the rights of foreign military vessels and aircraft in India's maritime zones and India's maritime boundary agreements.

Under India's Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, and subsequent notifications, New Delhi has established certain requirements that Washington considers inconsistent with its interpretation of international law.

These include:

Territorial sea: India requires prior notification for foreign warships and submarines entering its territorial waters. The US contests such requirements, arguing that warships are entitled to innocent passage without prior authorisation or notification.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): India maintains that foreign states must obtain its consent before conducting military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ and continental shelf. The US rejects this interpretation, arguing that military activities are among the freedoms available to other states in an EEZ.

Contiguous zone: Washington contests India's assertion of security-related jurisdiction in the contiguous zone beyond its territorial sea.

Hazardous cargo: The US challenges India's requirement for prior notification by vessels carrying certain dangerous or hazardous cargoes when entering its EEZ.

Baselines and Historic Waters: Washington disputes certain Indian baseline claims, including straight baselines around Lakshadweep, and India's declaration of historic waters in parts of the Palk Strait, Palk Bay, and Gulf of Mannar.

The US also disputes several of India's maritime boundary arrangements with neighbouring countries, including Indonesia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

While most FONOPs concern the interpretation of maritime jurisdiction, a challenge to India's baseline can have sovereignty implications because the FONOPs may involve entering waters India regards as its sovereign territory.

Where does India figure in the global FONOPS record?

An analysis of US operational assertions from 1991 to 2025 records 616 assertions against 75 countries, averaging approximately 18 per year across the reporting period. These are indicative figures because many individually listed operations involve multiple assertions.

India ranks seventh among the countries most frequently challenged by the US.

India has been challenged more often than several US allies and strategic partners, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Rankings alone, however, cannot determine whether the US is treating countries unfairly. The nature, frequency, and operational significance of the challenged claims must also be considered.

The figures nevertheless demonstrate that disagreements over maritime jurisdiction have remained a persistent feature of India-US relations, despite the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership and considerable expansion of bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

What happened in 2025, and how has India responded?

The three assertions (two of which were multiple assertions) recorded against India in FY2025 concerned straight baselines around Lakshadweep, India's requirement for prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ and continental shelf, and prior notification requirements for vessels carrying specified hazardous cargoes.

Two aspects merit attention.

First, the three assertions represent the highest annual total recorded against India in the dataset. Second, the US report mentioned India after a four-year gap since the previous recorded assertions in 2021. At that time, the Indian government conveyed its concerns to Washington diplomatically, and the FONOPs were also widely reported in the Indian and international media. The 2025 assertions, however, did not receive comparable public attention or a publicised diplomatic response from New Delhi.

How do US operations against India compare with those against China?

The India-China comparison is quite revealing. From 1992 to 2016, the US challenged Indian and Chinese maritime claims at broadly comparable rates. During this period, India accumulated approximately 17 assertions, compared with 14 against China. The divergence became pronounced after 2016.

In just FY2017 and FY2018, the US recorded 13 assertions against China, nearly as many as the 14 recorded during the preceding 20-year period. The timing is significant. China's large-scale island-building in the South China Sea, the militarisation of artificial features, the 2016 arbitral award in the Philippines-China dispute and the intensification of US-China strategic competition all contributed to the changing environment. The increase in FONOPs against China coincided with the Trump administration's tougher approach towards Beijing, including trade disputes, technology restrictions and heightened military competition.

The scale and timing of the increase suggest that the programme's implementation may be influenced by the broader strategic environment.

The China experience therefore raises a question relevant to India: can the frequency of FONOPs remain entirely separate from the wider political relationship between Washington and the country concerned?

Are US FONOPs neutral, irrespective of the country concerned?

The US maintains that the programme is impartial and that its operations are directed at maritime claims rather than the countries making them. Yet the distribution of operations is not uniform.

China and Iran account for 50 and 24 recorded assertions. Among US allies, Japan has eight recorded assertions and South Korea three, while the dataset records none against Australia or Canada, notwithstanding the existence of certain claims Washington considers inconsistent with international law.

A logical conclusion is that the timing, scale, and frequency of US FONOPs are linked to the US's bilateral relations with that country. Although the operation may have a legal basis, that alone does not fully determine how the FONOPs are conducted.

Significance for India-US relations

While the US continues to challenge India's maritime claims, cooperation between the two navies has expanded considerably. The apparent contradiction is striking.

The Indian Navy's growing reliance on US-origin platforms and weapons reflects the depth of India-US maritime cooperation. Its inventory includes: 12 Boeing P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, with another six in the pipeline; 24 Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk multi-role naval helicopters; and two General Atomics MQ-9B Sea Guardian high-altitude, long-endurance drones on lease, with two more leased at a reported cost of approximately ₹2,000 crore.

A larger proposed acquisition of 31 MQ-9B drones, including 15 for the Navy, is also under negotiation. The Navy also operates INS Jalashwa, formerly USS Trenton, an amphibious transport dock ship.

This equipment integration is reinforced by a network of enabling agreements, including Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA), General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Industrial Security Annex, which facilitate logistics support, secure communications, geospatial information-sharing, and defence cooperation. India's participation in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) framework, initially as an associate partner in 2022 and subsequently as a member, has further expanded operational engagement; the Indian Navy's assumption of command of Combined Task Force 154, focused on training and capacity-building, marked the first time India commanded a CMF task force.

Maritime domain awareness and information-sharing links have also deepened: the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram hosts a US liaison officer, while Indian officers serve at the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, the US Special Operations Command in Florida, and the CMF in Bahrain.

Beyond equipment, professional military education has fostered close institutional and personal links: the US Naval War College in Newport (Rhode Island, US) has educated generations of Indian naval officers, including nine Chiefs of the Naval Staff. Taken together, these links demonstrate an unusually high degree of operational, technological, and professional integration between the two navies, even though significant differences persist in the interpretation of India's maritime claims.

At the same time, the broader relationship has faced tensions over trade, tariffs, India's purchase of Russian oil, technology transfer, and the pace of negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement. Differences over Pakistan and India's strategic autonomy have also complicated the relationship.

Remarks by US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau at the 2026 Raisina Dialogue that the US would not repeat with India the same mistakes it believed it had made with China betrayed US anxieties and reflected a growing tendency of the American strategic establishment to view India through the prism of lessons learned from China's rise.

The rise in FONOPs against China, therefore, warrants examining whether operational assertions against India could also signal a changing US strategic posture towards India.

India's policy options

India's measured response ought to combine legal clarity, diplomatic consistency and periodic review of maritime cooperation.

First, New Delhi should establish a systematic process to record and assess each US operation against Indian claims. Public statements should clarify India's legal position, particularly regarding operations that involve territorial sea baselines or requirements that India regards as essential to its maritime security.

Second, India should review the costs and benefits of participating in US-led maritime arrangements. This need not entail withdrawing from the Malabar Exercise (an annual multilateral naval exercise involving India, the US, Japan, and Australia), the Quad (or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal forum involving the aforesaid four countries), or the CMF. Rather, it should ensure that cooperation advances Indian priorities and doesn't constrain India's independent assessment of regional security.

Third, India should invest in an inclusive, indigenous Indian Ocean maritime security architecture under its own leadership. Existing mechanisms, including the IFC-IOR, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), provide a foundation for cooperation with regional states.

Finally, India should continue diversifying its maritime partnerships. Engagement with the US can coexist with cooperation with Russia and other Indian Ocean countries. Strategic autonomy is strengthened by retaining the ability to choose and diversify partnerships in line with national interests.

Although the historical record doesn't prove that US FONOPs are a political instrument, it shows that their frequency has changed markedly alongside the evolution of US-China relations. For India, the challenge is to defend its legal position consistently while ensuring that its expanding naval partnership with Washington remains compatible with its maritime interests and strategic autonomy. A consistent Indian response would also ensure that operational cooperation with the US is not mistaken for acceptance of Washington's interpretation of maritime law.

The author is a veteran submariner. He is senior fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation.