India-US ties: Don't assume the Democrat victory means a new sunrise for this relationship

Summary

India is irrelevant to the domestic debate in America and not a major consideration in how China, Russia and Iran deal with Washington. US politics will remain uncertain while the wars in Ukraine and Iran will take their own turn. New Delhi must sail with the wind.

As it became clear that the US mid-term elections were heading for a Democratic landslide, a Bloomberg journalist asked me for a quick response on whether it would lead to an improvement in bilateral relations.

I told her that "my assessment is India should prepare for the rough ride we have had for the last two years," because the President and the executive branch have more or less the same power as they did before the election.

Donald Trump has defied all expectations of normal presidential conduct. It would be risky to base our expectations on the otherwise reasonable belief that the drubbing that he received at the hands of the American voter will chasten him.

While Trump is likely to remain his unpredictable self, we can envisage several scenarios for the remainder of his term based on two important but uncertain factors.

The first is domestic: the extent to which the Democratic-majority Congress will oppose his presidency (and whether the Republicans will see it profitable to disavow Trumpism).

For simplicity, let us consider three possibilities: that domestic opposition will be noisy but ineffectual, full of friction or lay an aggressive political siege to the White House.

The second is external: the degree of antagonism that China, Russia and Iran present to America. Again for simplicity, let us again consider three alternatives as to how this could play out: that the adversaries will wind down the ongoing conflicts, keep the conflicts going or up the ante.

Of the multiple possible scenarios, the most likely is the one where Trump encounters friction at home and there is no end to the conflicts with China, Russia and Iran.

This is not the worst-case for India, but one that entails a high degree of uncertainty. The relentless tug-of-war between the Congress and the White House will create a messy logjam. Trump can veto legislation that passes Congress.

While Democrats do not have the numbers to override the veto, Congress can exercise the powers it has to hobble the administration. It is quite likely to investigate, control money, withhold confirmations and attempt impeachments.

As much as New Delhi will have to deal with the Trump administration, the scope will be limited to transactional, short-term matters.

Under this scenario, it would be prudent for New Delhi to put the ball in the Trump administration's court as far as the trade agreement is concerned. It will be good to have one signed by the end of the year, but without making further concessions. Many Indian exporters seem to have adjusted to Trump's tariffs. Unless Washington changes them to benefit competitors, they will regain market share.

It is in India's interests that the US Congress acts to limit the market power of big technology companies, limit data centre construction in America, bring in governance frameworks for the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. These areas might offer common ground for the Indian government and the Congressional Democrats.

New Delhi must ramp-up its outreach in Washington to include both houses of Congress and both sides of the political aisle. Convergence over technology and climate policy could possibly offset differences over the liberal and progressive causes that animate the Democrats.

This will not be easy. Its success will be subject to the divergent line that the Trump administration is likely to take on all these issues.

What about the other scenarios? The most desirable one is where Trump and the Democrats slug it out on domestic politics, the wars in Ukraine and Iran are brought to an end, but the contestation with China becomes more intense. Energy prices will come down, threats of sanctions and politically-motivated tariffs will go away and India's geopolitical leverage will increase.

How likely is this? We cannot rule it out, but I think it is unlikely to materialize before 2029, and I would be thrilled to be wrong.

The worst scenario is where Trump cuts a deal with China while the other two wars rage on, the Democrats are ineffective in fighting Trump and decide to impose sanctions on trade with Russia. This too is unlikely, not least because it is not in China's interests to bail the US out from the mess it has gotten itself into.

In other words, we will have to wait some more for a new sunrise in relations between India and the US. This is just as well, because New Delhi has already been galvanized into strengthening ties with Europe, Canada, Southeast Asia and the subcontinental neighbourhood.

In the fullness of time, these might become the basis for a new global economic and security architecture.

It is important to remind ourselves that India is irrelevant to the domestic debate in America. Some Democrats might be concerned with civil liberties and Russia, but they have far bigger fish to fry. Similarly, India is not a major consideration in how China, Russia and Iran deal with Washington.

There is little we can do to change those equations. We can, however, trim our sails according to the way the winds blow.

The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy