Democrats need a foreign policy

Foreign policy issues aren't usually top of mind for midterm voters. But this time is different. Cost of living and inflation are tied as the top issues of concern for Americans. The Iran war itself ranks number three in one key poll, ahead of healthcare, ballooning federal debt or immigration. Voters have clearly made the connection that President Donald Trump's failures in the Middle East are directly tied to the prices they are paying at the pump.

Energy inflation is particularly pressing in key battleground states like Iowa, Alaska, Texas, Maine and Ohio, where people pay a relatively higher proportion of their take-home pay on things like gas, heating oil and electricity bills. This provides a big opportunity for Democrats, who are pressing home the connection between affordability and Trump's war in Iran. But it also opens a new challenge. If there is a blue wave in the midterms, and perhaps even a progressive president in 2028, what should a Democratic foreign policy look like?

This is an existential question for liberals, one that touches even bigger issues about what the Democratic Party stands for in the wake of Maga. Progressives rightly complain about Trump's incoherent tariff policies, tax cuts for rich people and companies, and unwinnable wars. But their own prescriptions are less clear. There is an ongoing debate about whether the party will pivot back towards Obama and Clinton-era centrism in response to Maga, or go down the more populist, left-leaning route that has been carved out by the Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren wing, and which may well triumph in key midterm elections focused on the cost of living.

In terms of how to deal with the rest of the world, this presents a particularly striking fork in the road. Foreign policy has too often been an elite project in the US. Policymakers have tended to be globalists who know a lot about the world, but less about how to sell free trade agreements, immigration policies or security alliances (and their costs) to domestic voters. The Biden administration started to connect some of those dots, with nascent conversations about "friendshoring," a word that former Treasury secretary Janet Yellen first used with me at an Atlantic Council event in 2022, and proclamations by former national security adviser Jake Sullivan about the end of the neoliberal consensus the year after. But historically, it takes more than one administration to move the needle on policy.

There is now a robust debate taking place behind closed doors about how liberals should engage with other countries. Answers can't come soon enough, given that foreign policy is now a linchpin for so many domestic issues. The fate of the US bond markets depends on whether foreign creditors will keep buying US T-bills. The ability of America to stay competitive with China in areas like electric vehicles will hinge on rare earth mineral alliances with allies, and shared standards and supply chains with other countries. US technology companies that want access to European markets will have to play ball with Brussels. As Pax Americana fades away, US policymakers -- and voters -- will have to think a lot more about the rest of the world and how to deal with it, just like other countries do.

The key issue will, as always, be China. There are some centrist Democrats who still imagine it might be possible to time warp back to the 2000s and pretend the last decade of tougher tariff policy never happened. But while voter views on China have softened slightly in recent years, double the percentage of Americans are distrustful of Beijing as they were twenty years ago (71 per cent in March 2026 versus 35 per cent in March 2005, according to Pew). Trump may end up being the least hawkish president on China in our lifetimes.

Still, smart Democrats (and Republicans) know America can't go it alone. Former Biden officials Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi have written articles arguing that it will be possible for a future Democratic administration to forge new alliances in a post-neoliberal world with old allies. They advocate industrial and technological diplomacy via the building of shared supply chains and capacity in key industries (like electric vehicles) with US allies (the EU, but also Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Japan). Given that the French and Germans are advocating for greater EU action around unfair Chinese trade practices, and the Japanese, Koreans and other Asian nations are eager to forge new alliances, it's an opportune moment to be thinking about what the new world trade order could look like.

The idea of focusing on economics rather than culture when it comes to foreign policy is smart, particularly as Republican presidential contenders such as Marco Rubio are giving xenophobic speeches about "civilisational bonds" with Europe, even as both the US and Europe must ultimately pull in more immigrants to spur growth. But it will force liberals to take tough decisions about accepting money from top donors, like Big Tech companies, which will push back hard on the stronger AI regulation favoured by voters.

Democratic policymakers must buck that pressure. Foreign policy can no longer be an elite project. It must focus on the shared problems of workers at home -- and abroad.